US–Iran Peace Draft: Is It Workable and Where Are the Risks? by Mian Majid Ali Afzal
US–Iran Peace Draft: Is It Workable and Where Are the Risks?
By Mian Majid Ali Afzal
As a student of defense and strategic security studies, my assessment of the proposed US–Iran Peace Draft of May 2026 is that the framework is technically workable, but politically fragile. The agreement addresses the core objectives driving the current crisis: preventing a wider regional war, restricting Iran’s nuclear escalation, and creating a pathway for phased sanctions relief. However, the durability of the deal depends less on the text itself and more on verification mechanisms, regional buy-in, and crisis management during implementation.
The draft reflects a familiar strategic reality. Iran seeks sanctions relief and the unfreezing of financial assets. The United States seeks a rollback of Iran’s nuclear capabilities and limitations on regional escalation. Meanwhile, Gulf states, Israel, and broader regional actors primarily seek stability and the prevention of another prolonged conflict in the Middle East.
The challenge is that every previous US–Iran understanding has eventually collapsed due to mistrust, verification disputes, regional proxy warfare, or domestic political pressure. Therefore, the success of this draft depends on whether it can close the loopholes that undermined previous agreements, particularly the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
1. Ceasefire and Military Actions
Immediate and Comprehensive Ceasefire
The ceasefire provision is essential, but it requires a structured verification mechanism. A 72-hour verification period monitored by neutral third parties, such as Qatar or Pakistan, would help confirm that both sides have halted military operations before the agreement fully enters into force.
The greatest risk is that a single retaliatory strike, whether intentional or accidental, could collapse the process within days. A permanent military hotline between Washington and Tehran is therefore necessary to de-escalate incidents in real time and avoid miscalculation.
Halt to Targeting Infrastructure
The agreement should explicitly define “infrastructure” to include energy facilities, ports, hospitals, desalination plants, civilian airports, and communication networks. Without clear definitions, both sides may exploit ambiguity by targeting “dual-use” facilities under military justification.
This loophole remains one of the most dangerous elements in the draft because modern conflicts increasingly blur the line between civilian and military infrastructure.
End of Media Hostilities
The inclusion of media de-escalation is strategically important. State media outlets, official spokespersons, and government-linked social media accounts should be included under a temporary 30-day restraint framework.
Historically, inflammatory rhetoric has repeatedly undermined diplomacy between Iran and the United States. Hardline factions on both sides can use aggressive media narratives to sabotage negotiations and mobilize domestic opposition.
Respect for Sovereignty
This clause should be linked to a broader non-interference framework under a United Nations Security Council format. Such institutionalization would make future violations diplomatically identifiable and internationally actionable.
2. Maritime and Regional Security
Freedom of Navigation in the Strait of Hormuz
The Strait of Hormuz remains one of the world’s most critical maritime chokepoints, carrying nearly one-fifth of global oil trade. The proposal for freedom of navigation is workable only if monitored collectively rather than unilaterally.
A temporary framework involving joint US-Gulf naval patrols alongside UN monitoring mechanisms for the first 90 days could provide confidence-building measures without creating perceptions of occupation or dominance.
The risk is that Iran may continue selective inspections of vessels under the pretext of security enforcement. If shipping uncertainty continues, global markets will still interpret the region as unstable.
Ending Blockades and Reducing Tensions
The proposal should connect maritime normalization directly to phased sanctions relief. For example, Iran could reopen unrestricted shipping lanes while the United States simultaneously releases specific tranches of frozen assets.
The danger is timing asymmetry. If sanctions relief is delayed, Iran could rapidly return to maritime pressure tactics or regional escalation.
Ending Proxy Warfare
This is arguably the most difficult issue in the entire agreement. Any meaningful peace arrangement must include written commitments regarding Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iranian-linked militias operating in Iraq and Syria.
Vague language regarding “regional protections” will not satisfy Israel or the Gulf states. Without explicit guarantees, regional allies may actively resist the agreement or undermine it through independent military actions.
This issue represents the primary structural breaking point of the draft.
3. The Nuclear Program
Temporary Halt to Enrichment
Any halt to uranium enrichment must be verifiable immediately through International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) cameras, digital seals, and real-time monitoring systems.
The current compromise range of 12 to 15 years appears politically realistic. The United States would prefer a longer framework, while Iran has historically resisted extended restrictions.
A practical compromise would link sanctions relief extensions to positive IAEA compliance reports every two years. This creates incentives for continuity instead of confrontation.
Limited Enrichment to 3.67 Percent
Allowing enrichment at 3.67 percent after the moratorium mirrors the original JCPOA framework, but enrichment caps alone are insufficient.
Iran’s uranium stockpile should also be capped to prevent a rapid breakout capability.
Binding Assurance Against Nuclear Weapons
Political assurances alone are inadequate. The commitment should be institutionalized through a United Nations Security Council resolution to increase diplomatic and legal pressure against future violations.
Ban on Underground Facilities
The closure or sealing of underground facilities remains one of the most sensitive issues. Iran views such sites as strategic deterrence assets designed to survive military strikes.
However, without restrictions on hardened underground facilities, Western states will continue doubting the sincerity of Iranian compliance.
Expanded IAEA Inspections
Expanded inspections must include snap inspections, online enrichment monitoring systems, and conditional access to military facilities where undeclared nuclear activity is suspected.
This remains politically difficult because Iran resisted similar inspection demands between 2021 and 2024. However, without intrusive verification mechanisms, international confidence in the agreement will remain weak.
4. Sanctions, Assets, and Implementation
Gradual Lifting of US Sanctions
Sanctions relief should be eased and directly linked to IAEA verification benchmarks. For example, partial relief could begin after 60 days of verified compliance.
Front-loading sanctions relief would reduce Iran’s incentive to continue long-term compliance.
Unfreezing Iranian Assets
A phased escrow mechanism focused initially on humanitarian and energy-sector expenditures would reduce political backlash inside the United States while still providing Iran with economic incentives.
However, legal challenges inside US courts could complicate or delay implementation.
Joint Oversight Mechanism
The oversight body must possess enforcement authority, including the ability to recommend snapback sanctions.
Without enforcement mechanisms, the body risks becoming symbolic rather than operational.
The additional risk is geopolitical fragmentation. If Russia or China blocks enforcement actions for strategic reasons, the mechanism could become ineffective.
Negotiation Timeline
The proposed 30-day negotiation window is too rigid for such a complex agreement. Extension criteria should be pre-defined so that measurable progress automatically extends negotiations to 90 days if necessary.
Rigid deadlines often create diplomatic collapse rather than diplomatic urgency.
Venue: Islamabad or Geneva
A neutral venue, such as Islamabad or Geneva, remains strategically useful. Pakistan has demonstrated effectiveness as a discreet diplomatic intermediary in previous regional negotiations.
However, venue politics must be managed carefully to avoid perceptions that one side is receiving a geopolitical advantage.
5. Outstanding Issues
Defining Remaining Disputes
The agreement should explicitly identify unresolved issues, including ballistic missile development, proxy activities, compensation mechanisms, and regional security guarantees.
Ambiguity allows both sides to interpret obligations differently and later accuse the other of non-compliance.
Removal of Highly Enriched Uranium Stockpiles
Transporting highly enriched uranium stockpiles abroad under IAEA supervision, potentially to Russia or another neutral state, would significantly reduce breakout risk.
Strategically, this is one of the most effective confidence-building measures available.
However, domestically, Iranian hardliners may portray the move as surrendering national sovereignty and strategic independence.
Final Assessment
The hard truth is that all parties involved are negotiating from necessity rather than trust.
Iran urgently requires sanctions relief and access to frozen assets amid economic pressure. The United States seeks to prevent a nuclear escalation and avoid another major Middle Eastern conflict during a period of global strategic competition. Regional actors primarily want stability and uninterrupted energy flows.
The framework is therefore workable in theory, but only if verification mechanisms are immediate, sanctions relief is phased carefully, and regional proxy networks are explicitly addressed.
If either side uses the proposed negotiation period merely to delay, rearm, or posture politically, the agreement could collapse within weeks, and military strikes could resume rapidly.
The central lesson is clear: diplomacy without enforcement will fail, while enforcement without diplomacy will eventually produce another regional war.
The writer is the author of “The Reforms” and serves as a Strategic and Administrative Adviser on South Asia Affairs for a CPEC-based project in Islamabad. He is also a Strategic Communication Adviser at the Institute of Strategic Communication & Economic Studies (ISCES). He can be reached at mianmajid582@gmail.com.
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